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Close Readings and Critical Perspectives
Edited by Lee Rothfarb, Alexander Wilfing, and Christoph Landerer

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The Aesthetic Legacy of Eduard Hanslick

Close Readings and Critical Perspectives

Edited by Lee Rothfarb, Alexander Wilfing, and Christoph Landerer

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Preface

Lee Rothfarb, Alexander Wilfing, and Christoph Landerer

When Eduard Hanslick published *On the Musically Beautiful* (hereafter *OMB*) in 1854, it was certainly unforeseeable for the then 29-year-old jurist that the "booklet," as he called it (*OMB*, lxxiii), would soon become an epoch-making treatise and one of the most important and influential texts in the history of musical aesthetics. In editing a reprint of Gustav Cohen's translation of *On the Musically Beautiful* into English, for example, the philosopher and aesthetic theorist Morris Weitz likens the import of Hanslick's treatise to that of David Hume: *OMB*, he contends, "is to music what Hume … is to speculative philosophy, a devastating critique of unsupportable views and an attempt to state clearly and precisely the territories and boundaries of the areas to discuss."[1] The book, whose preface was completed on Hanslick's birthday (September 11, 1854), was as timely as it was controversial—Hanslick's polemics against the "feeling theory" of music captured the scientific spirit of the mid-nineteenth century at a time when musical discourse was still largely dominated by older approaches, in the tradition of the "doctrine of affects" (*Affektenlehre*), i.e. passions or feelings.[2]

Yet the scientification of musical aesthetics that Hanslick hoped to achieve, and its sober-minded approach, conflicted sharply with contemporaneous musical trends and their enthusiastic advocates, namely program music and Wagner's musical drama. The vast range of aesthetic approaches to music in mid- to late-nineteenth-century German-language scholarship can best be illustrated by treatises provided by Hermann von Helmholtz, who in his *Die Lehre von den Tonempfindungen* (*On the Sensation of Tone*, 1863) propelled the scientification of aesthetics to hitherto unknown heights, while Friedrich von Hausegger's *Die Musik als Ausdruck* (*Music as Expression*, 1885)—his reception of Charles Darwin and Herbert Spencer notwithstanding—largely resisted this trend towards sober analysis.[3] Hanslick's work thus lies at the crossroads of two important cultural trends that hit the nerve of the century, with *OMB* combining a distinctly progressive, scientific approach, with a somewhat conservative

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Lawrence M. Zbikowski

Introduction

It can be a challenge to say something—anything—new about Eduard Hanslick's *On the Musically Beautiful*, a book that has generated commentary for 170 years. That said, the recent translation by Lee Rothfarb and Christoph Landerer offers an opportunity to think anew about Hanslick's contribution to the aesthetics of music and its legacy. In this chapter, I would like to take up one of the central issues engaged within Hanslick's aesthetics—the relationship between music and the emotions—and consider how it shaped his ideas about the musically beautiful, ideas that continue to resonate today. To set the stage, I shall begin with a brief review of two broad theoretical approaches to the emotions that informed Hanslick's thinking. The first approach, which predominated in the eighteenth century, assumed that there was a causal connection between environmental circumstances—including listening to music—and the emotions individuals experienced and that subsequently shaped their actions. The second approach, which emerged during the nineteenth century, saw emotions as physiological and psychological processes that could be studied empirically. Hanslick found neither approach convincing, and yet his engagement with each had a shaping influence on his musical aesthetics. As a way to understand how this engagement shaped his aesthetics—and thus his legacy for musicology in general, and the study of music and emotions in particular—I shall take up one of the paths through *On the Musically Beautiful* suggested by Rothfarb and Landerer, a path they propose presents the logical and chronological course of Hanslick's argument. This strategy will offer a way to observe how Hanslick reasons through the challenges presented by emotional responses to music and thus better appreciate his contributions to musical aesthetics. By way of conclusion, I shall offer a few brief reflections on the current state of research on music and the emotions, as well as thoughts on how we might move beyond Hanslick's emotional legacy.

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Theories of the Emotions in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries

Causal Accounts of Music's Influence on Emotional States

The notion that listening to music has a profound effect on emotions is one that is widespread across human history, although just what counts as "music" or "emotion" has hardly been invariant. In eighteenth-century Europe, this perspective coalesced into what came to be called the doctrine of the affections, or the *Affektenlehre*, although—as Tomás McAuley has recently observed—there was never really a unified doctrine as such, only a widely held belief that music had a causal impact on affectual dispositions.[1] This impact was often attributed to mimesis, an explanation of the efficacy of the arts almost as ancient as the idea that music shaped emotions.[2] Thus the Abbé Dubos, in a treatise on poetry, painting, and music first published in 1719, wrote:

> Wherefore as the painter imitates the strokes and colors of nature, in like manner the musician imitates the tones, accents, sighs, and inflexions of the voice; and in short all those sounds, by which nature herself expresses her sentiments and passions. These, as we have already observed, have a surprizing power of moving us, by reason of their being signs instituted by nature, from whence they receive their energy.[3]

Although Dubos offered no further explanation for why or how music shaped emotions (other than insisting that the composer's imitations be as precise as possible), the premise of causality upon which his explanation was based—music x will cause the listener to experience emotion y—was one that was widely accepted across eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe. Indeed, it is this basic premise that is behind the various assertions about the relationship between music and emotions that Hanslick gathered in the rogues' gallery of quotations that concludes chapter 1 of *On the Musically Beautiful*. That said, the understanding of how physiological processes shaped mental dispositions—including the emotions—grew more sophisticated over the span covered by these quotations, and the nuance this added to accounts of how music shaped emotions was largely ignored by Hanslick. Take, for example, the quotation Hanslick excerpted from Johann Jakob Engel's *Über die musikalische Malerey* (On Painting in Music), first published in 1780. As presented by Hanslick, Engel is understood to assert that "a symphony, a sonata, etc. must contain the realization of a passion, which however mutates into various sentiments" (*OMB*, 12). In full, however, the passage reads as follows:

> If a symphony or sonata—any musical work not supported by speech or the art of gesture—is intended to be more than just an agreeable noise, a pleasing buzz of tones, it must contain the realization of a single passion. It must contain the sort of sequence of feelings that would evolve by itself in a soul completely immersed in a passion, unhindered by externals, and uninterrupted in the free flow of its ideas.[4]

What is lost in Hanslick's gloss is the complex web of ideas Engel activates. For Engel, a "single passion" itself contains a sequence of feelings, and this sequence develops in a soul immersed in that passion and focused on the ideas it summons.

The context for this assertion is established earlier in Engel's treatise, when—having listed nine different variables a composer can control to paint images—he explains how the manipulation of these variables gives rise to emotional responses:

> All representations of the passions in the soul are inseparably bound up with certain corresponding movements in the nervous system, and are maintained and strengthened by the perception of these movements. But it is not just that these corresponding natural vibrations arise in the body when the representations of the passions have already been stimulated in the soul; these representations also arise in the soul if the related vibrations are already produced in the body. The action is reciprocal: the same path that runs from the soul into the body runs back from the body into the soul. By nothing else, however, are these vibrations so certainly, so powerfully, so variously produced, as by tones.[5]

As Engel saw it, then, affectual responses to musical works were the result of a complex interplay between sound, physiological responses, and mental states.[6] To be sure, Engel could do little more than sketch this interplay, and yet its very complexity was for him bound up with the communicative resources offered by music. It also bears mention that the representation of the passions in the soul constitutes *ideas*, that is, the content of thought.

This perspective on the relationship between physiological responses, emotions, and ideas was hardly unique to Engel. David Hume, writing about the origin of ideas in *A Treatise of Human Nature* some forty years earlier, drew a distinction between two different kinds of information gathered by the body and mind, which he called "impressions":

> Impressions may be divided into two kinds, those of SENSATION and those of REFLECTION. The first kind arises in the soul originally, from unknown causes. The second is deriv'd in a great measure from our ideas, and that in the following order. An impression first strikes upon the sense, and makes us perceive heat or cold, thirst or hunger, pleasure

> or pain of some kind or other. Of this impression there is a copy taken by the mind, which remains after the impression ceases; and this we call an idea. This idea of pleasure or pain, when it returns upon the soul, produces the new impressions of desire and aversion, hope and fear, which may properly be call'd impressions of reflection because deriv'd from it. These again are copy'd by the memory and imagination, and become ideas; which perhaps in their turn give rise to other impressions and ideas. So that the impressions of reflection are only antecedent to their correspondent ideas; but posterior to those of sensation, and deriv'd from them.[7]

Two observations are important here. First, having made a distinction between sensation and reflection, Hume set the former aside—reckoning it to be the province of anatomists and scientists (or "natural philosophers," as he called them)—and chose to focus exclusively on reflections and the ideas from which they were derived. Engel, of course, does not appear to have had any difficulty with describing a link between sensations and reflections, believing that such links can be explained through "movements in the nervous system" that stimulate the soul. Second, for Hume, the ideas associated with pleasure or pain were not involved in a reciprocal relationship with the body as they were for Engel: ideas, and the reflections they produced, remained in the mind where they might give rise to further ideas such as hope or fear.[8]

One of the consequences of Hume's distinction between sensation and reflection was the severing of an obvious causal relationship between the reception of musical sounds and the emotions (which, in this context, Hume called "passions") that such sounds might evoke. For Hume, such emotions were the content of reflective thought.[9] And so while Engel might well argue that musical tones were the most powerful means of stimulating the movements of the nervous system associated with emotional responses, for Hume the physiological sources of the passions remained distinct from the passions themselves.

Although Engel completed a doctorate in philosophy at Leipzig at a time when Hume's contributions were in circulation, it is not clear how much, if at all, the older philosopher's thinking influenced his own. By contrast, Hume's influence on another German philosopher—Immanuel Kant—was attested to by Kant in the preface to his *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, although the extent and substance of that influence have been the subject of lively scholarly debate.[10] And while Kant's influence on Hanslick is, to be sure, more than a little complicated,[11] one aspect of Kant's thought that has specific bearing on Hanslick's thinking on emotional responses—an aspect intimately related to Kant's response to Hume—is the idea of pathological emotions, which play a key role in the fifth chapter of *On the Musically Beautiful*.

Before turning to the role of pathological emotions in Kant's philosophy, it should be noted that during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries—and well into the nineteenth—"pathology" could refer to the study of the emotions.[12] Within such pathological studies, the assumption was that the emotions were not under conscious control, having their origins in physiological responses to or interactions with the world at large. In German-language writing, the term was later expanded to include information gathered from a range of perceptual and proprioceptual sources. Carl Christian Erhard Schmid's dictionary of terms used in Kant's writing, for instance, defined "pathological" as "that which depends on the passive sensuous part of human nature."[13] Accordingly, the pathological could be seen to be broadly equivalent to what Hume called "sensations": pathological emotions were simply sensations like pleasure and pain that had a precognitive affectual valence.[14]

As is well known, music posed a problem for Kant's aesthetics, not least because the substance of music appeared to be pure sensation (and thus pathological). In his comparison of the beautiful arts, he placed it after poetry. He reasoned thus:

> For, although of course it speaks through mere sensations without concepts, and hence does not, like poetry, leave behind something for reflection, yet it moves the mind in more manifold and, though only temporarily, in deeper ways; but it is, to be sure, more enjoyment than culture (the play of thought that is aroused by it in passing is merely the effect of an as it were mechanical association); and it has, judged by reason, less value than any other of the beautiful arts.[15]

The enduring problem of music was thus the lack of what for Kant counted as cognitive content: music at best merely played with the sensations, leaving no lasting impressions.[16] And without such content music could be agreeable but not truly beautiful. As Tomás McAuley notes, "to judge something as beautiful is, for Kant, to take pleasure in it. For the cognitive faculties fully to be engaged, however, the pleasure taken in art must itself be cognitive. If this pleasure is mere sensation (*Empfindung*), the cognitive faculties are not fully engaged, and the power of judgment is not able to play its mediating role."[17]

Again, Kant's influence on Hanslick is debatable. Nonetheless, Kantian philosophy provided Hanslick with a way to categorize, and ultimately to marginalize, affectual responses to music that were based on sensation alone. Such responses were, for Hanslick, evident in the innumerable listeners who had allowed their minds to become ensnared by the natural power of musical tones, a thralldom that prevented them from contemplating the true content of music:

> By allowing the elemental in music to affect them in passive receptivity, they end up in vague, supersensuously sensuous agitation determined only by the very general character of the piece of music. Their behavior toward music is not contemplative but *pathological*, a constant dozing, feeling, rhapsodizing, fear, and dread in resounding nothingness.
> (*OMB*, 81–82)

I shall want to return to the role of pathological emotions in Hanslick's aesthetics in the next main section of this chapter. For the moment, two points bear emphasis. First, over the course of the eighteenth century and well into the nineteenth, causal accounts of how music shaped emotional responses became more complicated. This is not to say that there were convincing explanations of the mechanism through which this shaping was effected, only that the causal connection between music and emotion was not in all cases conceived to be as simple as the quotations set out in Hanslick's rogues' gallery might suggest. As a fuller consideration of Engel's writing shows, some accounts of the relationship between musical sounds and the emotions were embedded within rather complex philosophical perspectives on the connection between sensation and thought. Second, an important strand of eighteenth-century thought assumed that physiological responses to environmental conditions could be more or less cleanly separated from the contents of thought: "cognition" was where sensation left off and thought began.[18] Pathological emotions belonged to this realm of sensation, one in which responses were automatic and mechanical rather than contemplative and considered.[19] As the eighteenth century gave way to the nineteenth, however, the disjunction between physiological responses and the contents of thought began to be called into question, and nowhere more so than in the empirical studies of the emotions that developed during the nineteenth century.

Empirical Approaches to the Emotions during the Nineteenth Century

Although emotional responses to works of art were an important topic during the eighteenth century, treatments of the emotions proper most often occurred in disquisitions on theology and morality. Within these writings, there was a tension between the demands of the flesh (which were understood to be the source of basic affectual responses) and the powers of the mind—manifested chiefly through the notion of the will—that might regulate or overcome such demands.[20] Among English-language writers, the preferred terms for characterizing various affectual dispositions that were manifested within the mind were "passions," "affections," and "sentiments." Although writers such as Hume would on occasion (and typically under the influence of French philosophers) speak of "emotion," the term

was not in wide circulation during the eighteenth century. This changed in the early nineteenth century when philosophers of mind in Scotland and England, seeking to distance themselves from theological and moral discussions, started to use "emotion" as a relatively neutral term for mental states closely allied with but distinct from sensations like touch, smell, and sight.[21] These same writers sought to develop an account of mental processes that mirrored contemporary work in physics and chemistry.[22] Within such accounts, sensations, emotions, and thoughts were conceived of as connecting together in chains of cause and effect that were modeled on Newtonian physics. These causal chains could then be analyzed according to the example provided by the new natural science of chemistry, whereby complex emotions could be broken down into their component parts or simple emotions understood to combine into more complex ones.[23]

The model of psychology and the possibilities for studying emotions that emerged from these philosophical approaches to the mind were informed by two significant trends. The first was the gathering of psychological evidence from close observations of the behavior of animals and infants, along with humans from different cultural backgrounds and with different mental capacities (with respect to this last, those classed as "insane"). Observations of this sort encouraged writers to think of emotions as a broad category of responses to an organism's external and internal environments. The second trend was the development, over the course of the nineteenth century, of evolutionary hypotheses. Such hypotheses made it possible to explore questions of why humans had emotions and how (if at all) these emotions differed from the affectual responses of other species. Charles Darwin's interest in and studies of emotions can be taken as emblematic of both of these trends. In addition to reading widely on the topic early in his career, Darwin made a close study of the facial expressions and behaviors of his infant children beginning in 1838.[24] Later, in 1867, he circulated questionnaires to correspondents around the world asking them to observe the expressions of indigenous peoples with whom they had come into contact. Darwin also corresponded with directors of two asylums, believing that the insane were susceptible to strong emotions and would be unrestrained in expressing them.[25] Finally, the material set out in Darwin's *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals* of 1872 was initially planned to be a chapter in his 1871 *The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex* but soon expanded into its own full-length study, one in which the emotions were understood to manifest broadly across different species. Studies such as Darwin's *Expression*, along with earlier ones by Herbert Spencer and Alexander Bain, laid the groundwork for the empirical study of emotions as a fact of humans' mental lives, as well as a recognition that emotions were adaptive responses to environmental changes.[26]

In the course of the nineteenth century, then, emotions—their connections to theological or moral questions having been loosened—became fertile ground for philosophical speculation and empirical research. Such speculation and research were well represented in German-speaking countries, with contributions by Johann Friedrich Herbart, Rudolf Hermann Lotze, Hermann von Helmholtz, Gustav Fechner, and Wilhelm Wundt, among others.[27] It was the work of writers like these—the first three are mentioned specifically in *On the Musically Beautiful*—that shaped Hanslick's ideas about the possibility of studying emotions empirically. Hanslick viewed such study with much skepticism, especially when applied to emotional responses to music. As they are set out in the fourth chapter of *On the Musically Beautiful*, however, the grounds for such skepticism are somewhat muddled: legends of music's influence on emotions are mixed together with contemporary research on physiological responses to sound; the eighteenth-century Scottish physician Robert Whytt's study of the nervous system blended together with fantastic mid-nineteenth-century claims about "Goldberger electromagnetic chains"; and the whole used to cast doubt on the prospect of studying the psychological and physiological bases for emotional responses to music (*OMB*, 71–73). And so while Hanslick was intrigued by studies of acoustics and physiology of the sort undertaken by Helmholtz, he did not believe they could explain the way music shaped thought:

> how a stimulation of the auditory nerve, which we cannot even trace to its origins, enters into consciousness as a specific sensatory quality, how the corporeal impression ultimately becomes a state of mind, the sensation of a feeling—that lies on the other side of the obscure bridge that has not been crossed by any researcher. There are a thousandfold roundabout descriptions of the one primordial riddle: of the connection of the body with the mind. That sphinx will never reveal its secrets.
>
> (*OMB*, 77–78)

To be sure, the question that Hanslick opens up here—the connection of the body with the mind—is one that, 170 years later, researchers in cognitive science still struggle to answer. This is not, however, to say that the nineteenth century had no answers to this question, only that Hanslick found them unsatisfactory for his purposes.

The early nineteenth century, then, bore witness to an increased interest in the scientific study of the mind, a pursuit in which "the emotions"—a novel category of affectual dispositions neutral with respect to moral philosophy—played a significant role. Emotions were significant because they were understood, on the one hand, to be shaped by physiological processes and, on the other hand, to be manifested in psychological

states, especially those associated with volition. Emotions were thus an important part of the means through which organisms responded to their environments. Music was, of course, one part of humans' environment, but at the time Hanslick wrote, it cannot be said that research on how musical sound shaped emotional responses had advanced very far—indeed, a case can be made that it is *still* in its infancy. What could also be said, however, is that the aesthetic program launched by Hanslick was one that was hardly supportive of such research and that it ultimately put in place significant barriers to understanding how and why music shapes emotions.

Hanslick's Aesthetics and Emotional Responses to Music

Rothfarb and Landerer's Logical-Chronological Route

In exploring an alternate path through Hanslick's *On the Musically Beautiful,* I am mindful that there has been extensive commentary on the treatise as it was originally published, and that—inasmuch as Hanslick never sought to alter the order of the chapters and never commented on the way this order presented his argument—the published version should be regarded as authoritative. Nonetheless, working through the chapters in the alternate order suggested by Rothfarb and Landerer offers a way to trace the development of Hanslick's views about the emotional responses evoked by listening to music and their place in musical aesthetics. That alternate order—which, as Rothfarb and Landerer see it, follows both the chronological sequence of Hanslick's work on the treatise and presents the logic of his argument—is chapters 6, 4, 5, 1, 2, 3, and 7. In what follows, I summarize briefly the content of each chapter—save for chapter 7, which does not directly engage with emotional responses to music—and comment on the way Hanslick's argument develops as we follow this alternate order.

Chapter 6—The Relation of Music to Nature: The question with which Hanslick begins is how nature relates to music, operating on the assumption (common in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and basic to Kant's aesthetics) that nature is, in the first instance, the source of beauty. The determining factor for Hanslick as he proceeds is not simply whether sounds are superficially pleasant but whether they are rationally—that is, humanly—organized. Such organization, which is guided by unconscious calculations of a sort that would have been familiar to Leibniz, creates an entirely new domain of sonic expression—as Hanslick puts it, "the 'music' of nature and the music of humankind are two different domains" (*OMB*, 100). This leads him to the conclusion that nature provides nothing that the composer can transform into art. Instead, the composer must create everything ex nihilo, drawing only on what he finds within himself.

> Through the concentration of his inner being, the composer must develop what the painter, the poet encounter in observing the naturally beautiful. He must wait for the propitious moment when something begins to sing and resound within him. Then he will immerse himself and create something from within that has no equivalent in nature and, hence, unlike the other arts, is also literally not of this world.
>
> (*OMB*, 103)[28]

With this assertion, Hanslick both establishes music as a singular form of art and severs the ties to mimesis that have informed theories of art since at least the time of Plato. This nonetheless leaves him with a problem, which is how to explain emotional responses to music.

Chapter 4—Analysis of the Subjective Impression of Music: So what might it mean for the composer to create from within himself, and how is it that these creations reach the listener? As Hanslick sees it, the basis for this creation is the imagination, which is correlated with but separate from feelings and sensations: "An interior *singing*, not a mere interior feeling, motivates the musically talented individual to create a piece of music" (*OMB*, 65). This "interior singing" is, in Hanslick's view, based not on feelings but on a response to the objective materials basic to music: what is "expressive" in music already exists within musical materials rather than in the feelings of the composer. This perspective allows Hanslick to introduce a clear aesthetic standard focused on the arrangement of musical materials. The beauty of a musical work is to be judged on the extent to which it unifies the materials from which it is formed: everything has to fit together properly, and nothing can be extraneous. As Lee Rothfarb and others have noted, this aesthetic was not original to Hanslick; that said, in his hands it is realized as an architectonic and somewhat abstract standard for musical design in which "feeling" plays no part.

Feeling nonetheless returns by means of the performer's reproduction of the musical work.[29] It is this reproduction that vivifies the composer's creation and ultimately animates the listener. In Hanslick's words, "the cathartic and stimulating aspect of music resides in the act of reproduction, which lures the electric spark from obscure secrecy and causes it to leap the gap into the heart of listeners" (*OMB*, 68). What remains obscure, however, is the mechanism of "the invisible telegraph service between body and mind" (*OMB*, 71). It is the contemplation of this mechanism that leads Hanslick to his review of what history, psychology, and physiology can say about emotional responses to music—the survey of legends about and research on music's effects I noted above—a review that leads him to abandon hope that there can be any satisfying explanation for how music shapes emotional responses.

Chapter 5—Aesthetic Compared to Pathological Perception of Music: There is for Hanslick, then, no principled way to account for emotional

responses to music, and yet he cannot deny that listeners respond to music emotionally. His way out of this conundrum leads to what I believe is Hanslick's second aesthetic intervention, one that is specific to the view of musical reception he develops in *On the Musically Beautiful* but that has not generated significant comment.

As noted above, Hanslick characterized the behavior of listeners who responded only to the sensuous side of music as "pathological." This characterization can be understood in two ways. First, and as I have already suggested, Hanslick's use of "pathological" connects directly to the term as it was used within Kantian philosophy. This use is more or less neutral: the pathological is simply that which is associated with direct sensation and does not engage thought processes. There was, however, a second and quite familiar meaning of "pathological," which is that which is associated with disease and abnormality. The negative associations of this meaning serve Hanslick in important ways, for they allow him to establish a view of aesthetics which connects directly with morality.

Again, the problem Hanslick had to confront was listeners' emotional responses to music, which he connected with pathological behavior—that is, responding only to the sensuous aspect of music. He observed,

> In no other art is this possible to such a high degree as in music, whose sensuous side at least allows nonintellectual enjoyment. Although works of the remaining arts *endure*, the very *evanescence* of music resembles, in a dubious formulation, the act of something being consumed.

Such wanton consumption was to be resisted, for it prevented listeners from grasping the intellectual substance of music; this substance was not "feeling" but what he here called "concrete tone configurations" (*konkrete Tonbildungen*; *VMS*, 132; *OMB*, 84).[30] In the pages that follow, Hanslick again turns to history, but the image that emerges from the stories he recounts is one of depravity: the benefits of music that are celebrated by ancients and moderns alike are pathological, the response of primitives to the raw sensations of musical sound.

In this second pass through historical accounts of music's effects, Hanslick ridicules the ideas of earlier authors, who he believes sought to claim a moral value for music in the way it heightened or regulated emotional responses. Hanslick's own aim, however, is a rather different morality, one in which the intellect triumphs over the sensual.[31] Again and again, he disparages listeners who would lose themselves to music's sensuous delights, placing them beneath the aesthete who can renounce such pleasures and focus instead on the concrete tone configurations set out by the composer. To do so, Hanslick admits, is not easy, for the relentless emergence of musical sound requires constant attention. What is required of the listener is "not a type of *contemplation* that permits optional lingering

and interruption, but rather tireless *participation* in keenest alertness. With complex compositions, this participation can escalate to intellectual labor" (*OMB*, 89). And such labor requires both dedication and training: "Wallowing in feelings is mostly an affair of those listeners who have no education for the artistic understanding of the musically beautiful. The layperson 'feels' music the most, the cultivated artist the least" (*OMB*, 90). Learning to listen properly is thus a form of *Bildung*: to truly appreciate a musical work of art, one must disregard the immediate feelings it might arouse, to listen past these so as to be able to focus on its abstract structure. This sort of listening took effort and application—it was far from the easiest course—but the reward was a deeper understanding of musical expression.

I regard this second aesthetic intervention, which is centered on the notion of *Bildung*, as reflective of the historical moment Hanslick inhabited. The redistribution of wealth consequent to the burgeoning industrial revolution and political upheavals of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, together with the flourishing of public concerts, made it possible for individuals from a wide range of backgrounds to listen to music written by the most prominent of contemporary composers. More than any others, it was these listeners who were Hanslick's concern: "A fine cigar, a spicy delicacy, a warm bath achieves for them, unconsciously, the same thing as a symphony" (*OMB*, 83). If one was to be worthy of entry into the most elevated classes, however, one could not simply *consume* such things; one had to learn to *appreciate* them. Indeed, as Christian Thorau and Hansjakob Ziemer have observed, *On the Musically Beautiful* can be read as a school of listening, one that teaches the right and true way to listen.[32] Hanslick thus aimed to establish not only an objective standard for musical beauty but also to describe music's ideal subject—beautiful music demands a listener trained to appreciate its beauty.[33]

With this second aesthetic intervention, Hanslick's project could be viewed as complete, were there not two remaining problems. First, although Hanslick mentions other art forms as he develops his argument, his musical aesthetics remain somewhat outside aesthetics as a whole: music risks being the exception which proves the rule that nature is the ultimate source of all beauty. Second, there lingers the influence of feeling, which Hanslick had not quite managed to banish from his aesthetics. As he draws the chapter to a close, for instance, he offers yet another observation about the proper way to listen: "Only someone who retains not merely the general after-effect of feeling but rather the unforgettable, specific contemplative experience of precisely *this* particular piece of music has heard and enjoyed it" (*OMB*, 92). It seemed inescapable, then, that "feeling"—if only as a "general after-effect"—may still cast its shadow over aesthetic appreciation. To address these problems, Hanslick continued writing, retracing his

steps so that he might situate his aesthetics of music within a broader philosophical perspective and eliminate once and for all any role for emotional responses in aesthetic appreciation.

Chapter 1—The Aesthetics of Feeling: The tone Hanslick adopts as he reconsiders the path that took him from contemplating the relationship between nature and music to the conclusion that music's true content was divorced from the sensations associated with feelings is one that is more overtly philosophical, in two senses. First, Hanslick begins with aesthetics writ large: rather than focusing only on music, he now puts music in dialog with poetry and the visual arts. Second, he deploys—without comment or citation—formulations that his readers would have recognized as owing a significant debt to Kantian aesthetics: "The beautiful has no *purpose* at all, for it is mere *form*, which can be used, of course, for the most diverse purposes according to the *content* with which it is filled, but that has no content of its own other than itself" (*OMB*, 4). With this framework in place, he starts where he previously concluded, with an emphasis on the reception of music as an exclusively intellectual exercise, one that requires a cultivation of understanding and a rejection of sensation:

> In pure contemplation, the listener enjoys the sounding piece of music; all material interest must be kept at a distance. However, one such interest is the tendency to allow affects to be aroused. The exclusive activation of *understanding* through the beautiful operates *logically* instead of aesthetically. A predominating effect on *feeling* is more dubious, indeed even *pathological*.
>
> (*OMB*, 6)

He then proceeds to cast doubt on the validity of emotional responses to music, an argument that culminates with quotations from his rogues' gallery of misguided authors who, it could be assumed, stand in for misguided listeners of every stripe.

From the perspective provided by Rothfarb and Landerer's reordering of the chapters of *On the Musically Beautiful*, then, chapter 1 does not so much advance Hanslick's argument as reposition it so that it is part of a larger aesthetic project, one in which "feeling" is rejected as a basis for aesthetic evaluation. This perspective having been established, Hanslick can then return to the second problem left hanging at the end of chapter 5, which is the relationship between the feelings evoked by music and the true content of musical expression.

Chapter 2—The "Representation of Feelings" is not the Content of Music: Hanslick's first step is to clarify the nature of the feelings evoked by music. He begins by noting that the true character of a feeling becomes clear only when it is connected with conceptual knowledge.

> The feeling of hope is inseparable from the mental image of an expected, happier condition and is compared with the present one. Melancholy compares past good fortune with the present. These are very specific mental images and concepts. *Without them*, without this *cognitive* mechanism, we cannot call the present feeling "hope," not "melancholy."
>
> (*OMB*, 16)

As Hanslick sees it, however, music is not able to represent specific concepts but instead what he characterizes as "a certain circle of *ideas*." These ideas are invariably associated with dynamic processes of one sort or another: changes in force, motion, and proportion that give rise to images of intensification, attenuation, hastening, or hesitation, images that are in some cases simple, in others complex (*OMB*, 17).[34] This leads Hanslick to pose a rhetorical question: "*What* can music portray of feelings, then, if not their content?" The answer he gives extracts only what he needs from "feelings," leaving behind the sensations with which they are connected—what music can represent of feelings is only their dynamic properties.

Having turned his readers' attention to the representation of dynamic properties, Hanslick illustrates how music can accomplish such representations—that is, how the musically beautiful is created—through an analysis of a short section of Beethoven's overture to *The Creatures of Prometheus*. In his analysis, he tries to capture dynamic aspects of Beethoven's musical materials—he likens the opening of the melody to water jetting upward from a fountain and then rippling downward—and to highlight the formal balance of those materials (as demonstrated by the symmetry that obtains between the melody of mm. 1–2 and 3–4).[35] This analysis not only provides him with an example of the musically beautiful, it also demonstrates the value of focusing on instrumental music as the purest example of the composer's art. Of equal significance, Hanslick's in-depth survey of an unassuming fragment from Beethoven's oeuvre leads immediately away from any focus on the subjective emotional responses of the listener and toward an objective basis for the musically beautiful, one solidly grounded in the way musical materials are arranged.

Chapter 3—The Musically Beautiful: Having refuted the connection of the musically beautiful with feelings, Hanslick's engagement with emotional responses to music—in at least this interpretation of the logic and chronology of his argument—is complete. There is, however, one tantalizing further connection that emerges in this chapter. Having asserted that the content of music is sonically moved forms, Hanslick then explores ways to explain the specifically musical properties that make such forms coherent wholes. One of the explanations he offers is that the organization of musical materials is part of the nature of the world: "All musical elements have among themselves secret alliances and elective affinities

grounded in natural laws. Those elective affinities, invisibly governing rhythm, melody, and harmony, demand compliance in human music, and they stamp every contradictory connection as arbitrary and unattractive" (*OMB*, 45). The notion of "elective affinities" that Hanslick uses here—in German, *Wahlverwandtschaften* (*VMS*, 79)—almost certainly owes something to Goethe's novel of the same name. That notion, however, was borrowed from seventeenth- and eighteenth-century chemical theories that sought to explain why some elements combined with one another, and some did not.[36] As noted above, during the early nineteenth century chemistry provided a model through which relationships among different emotions—their combination and aggregation—could be explained. One might argue, then, that through his oblique reference to Goethe's novel of emotional alliances—alliances modeled on the idea of affinities between elements—Hanslick had provided yet another path for feelings to enter musical content.[37]

As an aesthetician, then, Hanslick could well celebrate having banished feelings from the evaluation of musical works. As a sensitive listener, however, he was far from comfortable with the notion that music was pure, inert form: thus the infamous "tönend bewegte Formen" that has proven to be yet another sphinx unwilling to give up its secrets. Perhaps these secrets might relate to how music can represent the dynamic aspect of feelings or the movement of physical objects through space, perhaps they might relate to mysterious elective affinities among tonal materials; more, Hanslick was unwilling to say.

Hanslick's Emotional Legacy

Hanslick aimed to provide a foundation for musical aesthetics based not on nature but on the fundamental properties of music as an expressive medium. Such an aesthetics rejected the notion of mimesis that had long shaped Western thinking about the arts and proposed in its place a standard of beauty based only on the degree to which the materials of an expressive medium related to and cohered with one another. Within such an aesthetics, there was no place for emotional responses; aesthetic judgments were to be based on reflective evaluations in which personal interest played no part. But what to do with the quintessential expression of personal interest—"feelings"—which appeared to be part and parcel of listeners' responses to works of music? Here, Hanslick provided a second evaluative criterion. There were, in brief, good listeners and bad listeners. Good listeners learned—indeed, labored—to ignore the sensations evoked by musical sound and to focus only on the musical materials themselves. Bad listeners, unwilling to take the necessary steps to improve their appreciation of music, surrendered themselves to immediate sensations (pathological

emotions) and became emblems of the primitive, depraved, and diseased: pathologies.

One part of Hanslick's emotional legacy, then, was to banish emotional responses from judgments of musical worth. At best, whatever you could feel upon hearing a musical work was an appreciation of your appreciation of the work's design. Such a perspective fit well with the idea of the work concept that was gaining traction during the nineteenth century and—Hanslick's valorization of the performer notwithstanding—supported Western musicology's growing obsession with the score.[38] Another part of Hanslick's emotional legacy was the model of the ideal listener he offered, a listener educated in the intricacies of musical organization and thus able to attend to these intricacies and ignore the wayward push and pull of "feelings."[39] Taking these two parts together, the legacy is chiefly negative—emotional responses not only have nothing to do with musical value, but listeners must learn to distrust them and suppress them at every turn. There is, however, another perspective from which Hanslick's emotional legacy is a positive one. After all, one thing that Hanslick was obviously passionate about was music, even if he was convinced that it could only be appreciated through a studied practice of dispassion. He understood that music did not conform to the same standard of beauty that might be applied to painting or poetry, and he identified the prominence of "feeling" in responses to music as key to accounting for its unique beauties. Given the research on emotions available to him and given his beliefs about the purposes of musical listening, it is not surprising that affectual responses played no part in the aesthetics he developed. And yet "feeling" still lurked in the shadows, a sultry temptress, the rejection of whom was part of the thrill of musical listening.

Afterword: Moving Beyond Hanslick's Emotional Legacy

One might hope that, more than a century and a half later, research on music and emotion could provide an emphatic riposte to Hanslick's assertion that music had nothing to do with the representation of feelings. Such, however, is not the case. Dale Bartlett, in a review of studies on physiological responses to music and sound stimuli that had been conducted over a 120-year period, concluded that the most that could be said was that music did in fact have an influence on bodily systems and that this influence was either stimulative or sedative.[40] This is hardly the stuff of which assessments of musical beauty are made.

There are a number of reasons for this rather dire situation. First, although the idea of emotions as shaped by physiological processes and manifested in psychological states was important in the formative years of the psychological sciences during the nineteenth century, by the early twentieth century interest in this remarkably complex topic had waned.

A robust, renewed program of research on the emotions only started to take hold—and then but gradually—in the 1970s. Second, while Leonard Meyer's *Emotion and Meaning in Music* of 1956 made a compelling case for the importance of listeners' emotional responses to the construction of musical meaning,[41] his approach did not lead to a sudden surge in work on music and emotion. This was due in part to a turn toward obdurately positivistic study in music theory during the 1960s, and a resultant lack of interest in listeners' emotional responses. Third, when music psychologists began to re-engage with the topic of music and the emotions in the 1990s, they tended to employ a rather undifferentiated approach to "the emotions," failing to distinguish between passing affectual dispositions, sustained high-intensity emotions, and all that might fall in between. In consequence, practically *any* response to music was interpreted as an emotional response, and researchers struggled to arrive at definitive results. Finally, music psychologists seemed to adopt the view that Hanslick took early in his work on musical aesthetics: for these psychologists, all of the various sounds that occur in the natural human environment belonged to one domain, and the sounds specific to music belonged to another domain. In conformance with this view, few studies contrasted listeners' affectual responses to musical sounds with their responses to natural sounds. As a result, music psychologists had scant proof that listening to music was any better at modulating emotional states than the sounds of lowing cattle or a burbling stream.[42]

It would seem, then, that Hanslick had won the day: 170 years of research provided no compelling argument that music was concerned with the representation of feelings.

But the situation is perhaps not quite so dire. Beginning in the latter part of the twentieth century, a number of researchers began to propose new models for how body and brain could interact, models to which emotion studies contributed considerably.[43] This led to the notion of grounded cognition, a wide-ranging research program based on the idea that cognitive processes were grounded in embodied experience.[44] Another important strand was studies which showed that an ability to make complex analogies contributed significantly to the distinctiveness of human thought.[45] Such studies provided a way to explain how music was able to portray the dynamic properties of feelings or—touching back on Hanslick's analysis of Beethoven's overture to *Prometheus*—the movements of physical bodies through space. My own work on musical grammar combined both of these approaches, together with research on construction grammars, to propose that one of the primary functions of music within humans' cultural interactions was to provide sonic analogs for dynamic processes.[46] The embodied experience of emotions offered one example of a dynamic process, but so did the physical gestures that accompany speech and the

patterned movements of dance. To be clear, what I proposed was not that music was concerned with the representation of feelings—I am more than happy to grant that victory to Hanslick—only that music could provide sonic analogs for the dynamic processes associated with feeling-states.

A victory I am less happy to grant to Hanslick is the one that ties the proper appreciation of music to an enlightened state of understanding: his distinction between good listeners and bad listeners. No doubt this reflects my own historical moment, but I simply do not believe that tracing thematic development within one of Beethoven's late compositions is an activity inherently more valuable than responding—physically, emotionally, *and* intellectually—to one of James Brown's grooves or to one of Beyoncé's songs.

Make no mistake, the emotional legacy of Hanslick's *On the Musically Beautiful* is one with which contemporary musicology continues to grapple. The questions of how, and in what ways, emotional responses matter to musical listening and how such responses might be studied are ones that are far from settled. The siren song of musical formalism continues to captivate music theory, a discipline often reluctant to admit that listening to music is every bit as important as contemplating it. And the issue of what counts as a good listener, or an ideal listener, is one that is more often ignored than it is addressed, the assumption being that any listener who engages with the music that matters to *me* is the listener who really matters. Hanslick's emotional legacy casts its shadow over all of these inquiries and yet—through a serious engagement with that legacy—might also provide a way to illuminate them.

Notes

1 Tomás McAuley, "Immanuel Kant and the Downfall of the *Affektenlehre*," in *Sound and Affect: Voice, Music, World*, ed. Judith Lochhead, Eduardo Mendieta, and Stephen Decatur Smith (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2021), 343.

2 For a discussion of the history of mimesis and its role in accounts of the arts, see Meyer Howard Abrams, *The Mirror and the Lamp: Romantic Theory and the Critical Tradition* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953).

3 Abbé (Jean-Baptiste) Dubos, *Critical Reflections on Poetry, Painting and Music: With an Inquiry Into the Rise and Progress of the Theatrical Entertainments of the Ancients*, vol. 1, 5th rev. ed., trans. Thomas Nugent (London: Printed for John Nourse, 1748), 360–61.

4 Johann Jakob Engel, "On Painting in Music (1780)," in *Source Readings in Music History*, vol. 5, *The Late Eighteenth Century*, ed. Wye Jamison Allanbrook (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1998), 960. Original wording: "Eine Symphonie, eine Sonate, ein jedes von keiner redenden oder mimischen Kunst unterstütztes musikalisches Werk,—sobald es mehr als bloss ein angenehmes Geräusch, ein liebliches Geschwirre von Tönen seyn soll—muss die Ausführung Einer Leidenschaft, die aber freilich in mannichfaltige Empfindungen ausbeugt, muss eine solche Reihe von Empfindungen enthalten, wie sie sich von selbst in einer ganz in Leidenschaft versenkten, von aussen ungestörten, in dem freien

Lauf ihrer Ideen ununterbrochenen Selle nach einander entwickeln." Johann Jacob Engel, *J. J. Engel's Schriften*, vol. 4, *Reden, Ästhetische Versuche* (Berlin: In der Myliussischen Buchhandlung, 1802), 323–24.

5 Johann Jakob Engel, "On Painting in Music (1780)," in *Source Readings in Music History*, vol. 5, *The Late Eighteenth Century*, ed. Wye Jamison Allanbrook (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1998), 958. Original wording: "Alle leidenschaftlichen Vorstellungen der Seele sind mit gewissen entsprechenden Bewegungen im Nervensystem unzertrennlich verbunden, werden durch Wahrnehmung dieser Bewegungen unterhalten und verstärkt. Aber nicht allein entstehn im Körper diese entsprechenden Nervenerschütterungen, wenn vorher in der Seele die leidenschaftlichen Vorstellungen erweckt worden; sondern auch in der Seele entstehn die leidenschaftlichen Vorstellungen, wenn man vorher im Körper die verwandten Erschütterungen verursacht. Die Einwirkung ist gegenseitig: eben der Weg, der aus der Seele in den Körper führt, führt zurück aus dem Körper in die Seele. Durch nichts aber werden diese Erschütterungen so sicher, so mächtig, so mannichfaltig bewirkt, als durch Töne." Johann Jacob Engel, *J. J. Engel's Schriften*, vol. 4, *Reden, Ästhetische Versuche* (Berlin: In der Myliussischen Buchhandlung, 1802), 312–13.

6 Roger Mathew Grant traces a similar species of attunement between musical sound and the body across a number of thinkers in chapter 4 of his *Peculiar Attunements: How Affect Theory Turned Musical* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2020).

7 David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature: A Critical Edition*, ed. David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton, The Clarendon Edition of the Works of David Hume (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007), 11.

8 For Hume's later thoughts on the relationship between sensations and ideas, see *A Dissertation on the Passions: The Natural History of Religion; a Critical Edition*, ed. Tom L. Beauchamp, Clarendon Edition of the Works of David Hume (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007), 4.

9 David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature: A Critical Edition*, ed. David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton, The Clarendon Edition of the Works of David Hume (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007), 181–82.

10 Abraham Anderson, *Kant, Hume, and the Interruption of Dogmatic Slumber* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020), 1–42.

11 For more on Kant's possible influence on Hanslick, see the essay on the philosophical background for Hanslick's *On the Musically Beautiful* in *OMB*, lv–lvii; Hanne Appelqvist, "Form and Freedom: The Kantian Ethos of Musical Formalism," *The Nordic Journal of Aesthetics* 40–41 (2011): 75–88; and Alexander Wilfing, "Hanslick, Kant, and the Origins of *Vom Musikalisch-Schönen*," *Musicologica Austriaca: Journal for Austrian Music Studies* (2018), https://www.musau.org/parts/neue-article-page/view/47. On this topic, see Hanne Appelqvist's chapter in the present volume, "Hanslick on the Purposiveness of Musical Form," 69–97.

12 See, for instance, the entries under "pathology" in the *Oxford English Dictionary Online*, June 2021, Oxford University Press, https://www.oed.com/dictionary/pathology_n, accessed August 16, 2021. Those interested in the *Affektenlehre* should note that a 1681 medical dictionary defined "pathologie" as "the doctrine of the passions."

13 Carl Christian Erhard Schmid, *Wörterbuch zum leichtern Gebrauch der Kantischen Schriften, nebst einer Abhandlung*, 4th rev. ed. (Jena: Crökersche Buchhandlung, 1798), 415. Original wording: "Pathologisch heißt dasjenige, was von dem passiven Theil der menschlichen Natur, von der Sinnlichkeit abhängt."

Cf. s.v. "Pathologisch" in Georg Samuel Albert Mellin, *Encyclopädisches Wörterbuch der kritischen Philosophie oder Versuch einer fasslichen und vollständigen Erklärung der in Kants kritischen und dogmatischen Schriften enthaltenen Begriffe und Sätze*, vol. 4 (Jena: Friedrich Frommann, 1801), 515.

14 For additional perspectives on the pathological within Kant's philosophy and its reception, see the essays collected in *Pathology & Aesthetics: Essays on the Pathological in Kant and Contemporary Aesthetics*, ed. Louis Schreel, Materialisierungen 4 (Düsseldorf: Düsseldorf University Press, 2016).

15 Immanuel Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, ed. Paul Guyer, trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews, The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 5:328.

16 Immanuel Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, ed. Paul Guyer, trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews, The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 5:329–30.

17 Tomás McAuley, "Immanuel Kant and the Downfall of the *Affektenlehre*," in *Sound and Affect: Voice, Music, World*, ed. Judith Lochhead, Eduardo Mendieta, and Stephen Decatur Smith (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2021), 353.

18 It bears mention that while "cognition" is still conceived of by some researchers as referring exclusively to thoughts and ideas that occupy conscious attention, empirical research of the past four decades has shown that such thought relies on processes that are broadly distributed throughout the brain and nervous system. While such processes may not be directly accessible to consciousness, it is clear that consciousness is impossible without them. Accordingly, many of these distributed (and nonconscious) processes are now characterized as "cognitive." For a recent philosophical perspective on these issues, see Andy Clark, *Surfing Uncertainty: Prediction, Action, and the Embodied Mind* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).

19 It should be noted that while the pathological certainly has a place in Kant's philosophy, he did not speak of pathological emotions in his *Critique of the Power of Judgment*. Kant's preferred term there was "affect." In a footnote to his remarks on aesthetic reflective judgments, he observes, "*affects* are specifically different from *passions*. The former are related merely to feeling; the latter belong to the faculty of desire, and are inclinations that make all determinability of the faculty of choice by means of principles difficult or impossible. The former are tumultuous and unpremeditated, the latter sustained and considered; thus indignation, as anger, is an affect, but as hatred (vindictiveness), it is a passion." Immanuel Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, ed. Paul Guyer, trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews, The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 5:272.

20 Thomas Dixon, *From Passions to Emotions: The Creation of a Secular Psychological Category* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), chap. 3.

21 Thomas Dixon, *From Passions to Emotions: The Creation of a Secular Psychological Category* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), chap. 4. Dixon identifies Thomas Brown, *Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind*, 4 vols. (Edinburgh: James Ballantyne and Co. for W. and C. Tait, 1820), as singularly influential with respect to the adoption of the term "emotion" for mental processes associated with affectual dispositions. The *Lectures* went through numerous editions and were widely read by subsequent writers on mind and emotion.

22 A similar approach can be seen in Johann Friedrich Herbart, *Lehrbuch zur Psychologie* (Königsberg: August Wilhelm Unzer, 1816). See also the helpful

introductory comments in Johann Friedrich Herbart, *A Text-Book in Psychology: An Attempt to Found the Science of Psychology on Experience, Metaphysics, and Mathematics*, trans. Margaret K. Smith, International Education Series (New York: D. Appleton, 1894); and Alan Kim, "Johann Friedrich Herbart," in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, sec. 3, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2015/entries/johann-herbart/.

23 Thomas Dixon, *From Passions to Emotions: The Creation of a Secular Psychological Category* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 118–19.

24 Thomas Dixon, *From Passions to Emotions: The Creation of a Secular Psychological Category* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 160. Charles Darwin's observations of his infant children are reported in chapter 6 of his *The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals* (London: John Murray, 1872).

25 Charles Darwin, *Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals* (London: John Murray, 1872), 13–18.

26 For a discussion of the contributions to research on emotion by Spencer, Bain, and Darwin, as well as connections between the three, see Thomas Dixon, *From Passions to Emotions: The Creation of a Secular Psychological Category* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), chap. 5.

27 Lothar Sprung and Helga Sprung, "History of Modern Psychology in Germany in 19th- and 20th-Century Thought and Society," *International Journal of Psychology* 36, no. 6 (2001): 364–76.

28 It bears mention that Hanslick's imagined composer is necessarily male (a view he makes explicit in chapter 4). This perspective guides my use of pronouns as they relate to Hanslick's imagined composer.

29 For more on the place of performance in Hanslick's aesthetics, see Anthony Pryer, "Hanslick's *Vom Musikalisch-Schönen* and the Notion of Performance Interpretation: Contexts and Consequences," in *Hanslick im Kontext: Perspektiven auf die Ästhetik, Musikkritik und das historische Umfeld von Eduard Hanslick / Hanslick in Context: Perspectives on the Aesthetics, Musical Criticism, and Historical Setting of Eduard Hanslick*, ed. Alexander Wilfing, Christoph Landerer, and Meike Wilfing-Albrecht (Vienna: Hollitzer, 2020), 131–51; Tiago Sousa, "The Role of the Performer in Hanslick's *On the Musically Beautiful*," *British Journal of Aesthetics* 64, no. 2 (2024): 157–72; and Anthony Pryer's chapter in the present volume, "A Problematic Legacy: Hanslick's *On the Musically Beautiful* and the Status of Performance as Supplementary to Beauty," 206–27.

30 Of course, in chapter 3, these "concrete tone configurations" are called "sonically moved forms," but in adopting Rothfarb and Landerer's changed order for the succession of the chapters, I see the latter formulation as a later adaptation of the idea first introduced in the 1853 essay "Ueber den subjektiven Eindruck der Musik und seine Stellung in der Aesthetik," *Oesterreichische Blätter für Literatur und Kunst: Beilage zur Oesterreichisch-Kaiserlichen Wiener Zeitung*, July 25, 1853, 177–78; August 1, 1853, 181–82; and August 15, 1853, 193–95.

31 The triumph of mind over body was, of course, part of theological and moral approaches to the emotions that were still current during Hanslick's time. For a discussion—albeit from an English-language perspective—see Thomas Dixon, *From Passions to Emotions: The Creation of a Secular Psychological Category* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), chap. 5 and chap. 6.

32 Christian Thorau and Hansjakob Ziemer, "The Art of Listening and Its Histories: An Introduction," in *The Oxford Handbook of Music Listening in the 19th and 20th Centuries*, ed. Christian Thorau and Hansjakob Ziemer (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019), 9–10.

33 On Hanslick's (normative) concept of proper musical listening, see Nick Zangwill and Alexander Wilfing's chapter in the present volume, "Music, Feeling, and Musical Listening: Themes from Chapters 4 and 5 of *On the Musically Beautiful*," 123–51.

34 I should add that I here use "image" in a very general way that comprehends sound sequences, physical movements, and tactile impressions, along with information gathered from visual input.

35 For more on Hanslick's treatment of *The Creatures of Prometheus*, see Lee Rothfarb's chapter in the present volume, "Taking Hanslick at His Music-Theoretical Word," 103–6.

36 William R. Newman, *Gehennical Fire: The Lives of George Starkey, an American Alchemist in the Scientific Revolution* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 231–34. Cf. Benjamin Steege, "Helmholtz, Music Theory, and Liberal-Progressive History," *Journal of Music Theory* 54, no. 2 (2010): 297–300.

37 Hanslick was not alone in entertaining such anthropomorphic musings: the notion of affinities between different pitches played a significant role in shaping nineteenth-century ideas about tonality. For a discussion, see Thomas Christensen, *Stories of Tonality in the Age of François-Joseph Fétis* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2019), chap. 1.

38 Lydia Goehr, *The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works: An Essay in the Philosophy of Music* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992).

39 Rose Rosengard Subotnik has written about this aspect of Hanslick's thought: Rose Rosengard Subotnik, "The Challenge of Contemporary Music," in *Developing Variations: Style and Ideology in Western Music* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), 277–79.

40 Dale L. Bartlett, "Physiological Responses to Music and Sound Stimuli," in *Handbook of Music Psychology*, 2nd ed., ed. Donald A. Hodges (San Antonio, TX: IMR Press, 1996), 343–85.

41 Leonard B. Meyer, *Emotion and Meaning in Music* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956).

42 I provide a fuller review of research on emotion, and on music and emotion, in chapter 3 of my *Foundations of Musical Grammar*, Oxford Studies in Music Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017).

43 As but one example, Antonio Damasio, in *Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain* (New York: Avon, 1994), made a strong argument for connections between body and brain based on how emotions shaped reasoning.

44 Representative research on grounded cognition can be found in *Grounding Cognition: The Role of Perception and Action in Memory, Language, and Thinking*, ed. Diane Pecher and Rolf A. Zwaan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); and *Embodied Grounding: Social, Cognitive, Affective, and Neuroscientific Approaches*, ed. Gün R. Semin and Eliot R. Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

45 See, for instance, Keith J. Holyoak, and Paul Thagard, *Mental Leaps: Analogy in Creative Thought* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995); and Douglas Hofstadter and Emmanuel Sander, *Surfaces and Essences: Analogy as the Fuel and Fire of Thinking* (New York: Basic Books, 2013).

46 Lawrence M. Zbikowski, *Foundations of Musical Grammar*. Oxford Studies in Music Theory (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017).

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Part IV

Imagination and Performance